

### **REMARKS**

In the outstanding Office Action<sup>1</sup>, the Examiner rejected claims 1 and 7-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 6,865,608 to Hunter ("Hunter") in view of U.S. Patent No. 7,362,727 to O'Neill et al. ("O'Neill") in further view of U.S. Patent Publication No. 2003/0033155 to Peerson et al ("Peerson").

By this Amendment, Applicants amend claims 1, 9, 12, 13, and 15-17 without prejudice or disclaimer of the subject matter thereof. Claims 1 and 7-17 are pending in this application:

#### **I. Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)**

Applicants respectfully traverse the rejection of claims 1 and 7-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hunter in view of O'Neill in further view of Peerson.

"The key to supporting any rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 is the clear articulation of the reason(s) why the claimed invention would have been obvious. . . . [R]ejections on obviousness cannot be sustained with mere conclusory statements." M.P.E.P. § 2142, 8th Ed., Rev. 6 (Sept. 2007) (internal citation and inner quotation omitted). "The mere fact that references can be combined or modified does not render the resultant combination obvious unless the results would have been predictable to one of ordinary skill in the art." M.P.E.P. § 2143.01(III) (emphasis in original). "In determining the differences between the prior art and the claims, the question under 35 U.S.C. 103 is

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<sup>1</sup> The Office Action contains a number of statements reflecting characterizations of the related art and the claims. Regardless of whether any such statement is identified herein, Applicants decline to automatically subscribe to any statement of characterization in the Office Action.

not whether the differences themselves would have been obvious, but whether the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious. M.P.E.P. § 2141.02(I) (emphases in original).

"[T]he framework for objective analysis for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is stated in *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q 459 (1966). . . . The factual inquiries . . . [include determining the scope and content of the prior art and] . . . [a]scertaining the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art." M.P.E.P. § 2141(II). "Office personnel must explain why the difference(s) between the prior art and the claimed invention would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art." M.P.E.P. § 2141(III).

Here, a *prima facie* case of obviousness has not been established because the Office Action has neither properly determined the scope and content of the prior art nor properly ascertained the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art. Accordingly, no reason has been clearly articulated as to why the prior art would have rendered the claimed invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.

Specifically, amended claim 1 recites a method for connecting to the Internet using a mobile terminal, the method comprising, among other things, a "number domain" that "comprises a contents classification number, a first domain number, and a second domain number," wherein "the first domain number is a highest level domain; and the second domain number is a number corresponding to a name of a site and corresponding to a letter designated on a key pad of the mobile terminal." Hunter, O'Neill, and Peerson alone or combined, fail to teach at least these elements.

The Examiner states that Hunter discloses that “the first domain number is a highest level domain,” citing column 5, lines 1-7, which discloses “ . . . the linkage codes of the invention are not limited to UPC code, . . . as well as custom linkage code formats.” Office Action at 4. This section of Hunter does not provide any disclosure that “the first domain number is a highest level domain,” as recited in claim 1 (emphasis added).

The Examiner further asserts that Hunter discloses that “number domain comprises a contents classification number,” citing column 5, line 1-18, which discloses “ . . . The linkage codes of the invention are not limited to UPC code, . . . as well as custom linkage code formats.” This section of Hunter does not provide any disclosure that “number domain comprises a contents classification number,” as recited in claim 1 (emphasis added). Hunter mentions that linkage code formats can be customized but does not disclose or imply the contents classification number part of the linkage code.

Applicants note that it is important to note not that the linkage code can be customized in many ways but rather, how the linkage code is customized. For example, if the number domain comprises the first domain number, which means a number corresponding to the highest domain number, users can input the first domain number of the present invention, instead of inputting the whole highest level domain. The first domain numbers for some frequently used highest level domain (such as “.com” and “.net”) can be set as a very small number such as 1, 2, . . . 9, and the user can easily input the frequently used highest level domain.

For example, if the number domain comprises the contents classification number, users can input contents classification number such as “111” for a directory service, and

"232" for an animation site. "yahoo.com" and "wahoo.com" have the same second domain number "92466" but by inputting contents classification number, each user can easily access the site that he/she wants. Each user can memorize the contents classification number for content that he/she is interested in, and can easily access the interested site by inputting the contents classification number that he/she memorized.

For at least these reasons, Hunter thus fails to disclose a "number domain" that "comprises a contents classification number, a first domain number, and a second domain number," wherein "the first domain number is a highest level domain and the second domain number is a number corresponding to a name of a site and corresponding to a letter designated on a key pad of the mobile terminal," as recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in independent claims 9, 12, 13, and 15-17 (emphasis added).

O'Neill fails to cure the deficiencies of Hunter. In the Office Action, the Examiner assert that O'Neill discloses "wherein the number of bytes allocated to classification in a number domain is predetermined." O'Neill teaches a method of routing telecommunication signals to both fixed and mobile telecommunications mediums and more specifically, a method of routing packet-based communications. However, O'Neill fails to disclose a "number domain" that "comprises a contents classification number, a first domain number, and a second domain number," wherein "the first domain number is a highest level domain and the second domain number is a number corresponding to a name of a site and corresponding to a letter designated on a key pad of the mobile terminal," as recited in amended claim 1 (emphasis added).

Peerson also fails to cure the deficiencies of Hunter. The Examiner in the Office Action asserts that Peerson discloses “[allowing] the server to expertise the processing of user’s request by processing the numerical IP address rather than the domain name address.” Peerson teaches a method for providing analytical information to a customer based on integrated data stored in a warehouse. However, Peerson fails to disclose a “number domain” that “comprises a contents classification number, a first domain number, and a second domain number,” wherein “the first domain number is a highest level domain and the second domain number is a number corresponding to a name of a site and corresponding to a letter designated on a key pad of the mobile terminal,” as recited in amended claim 1 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the Office Action has neither properly determined the scope and content of prior art references, nor properly ascertained the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art references. Therefore, no reason has been clearly articulated as to why Hunter, O’Neill, and Peerson would have rendered the claimed invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. Claims 1, 9, 12, 13, and 15-17 are thus allowable over Hunter, O’Neill, and Peerson.

If an independent claim is nonobvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, then any claim depending therefrom is nonobvious. *In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner withdraw the rejection of dependent claims 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).


II. Conclusion

In view of the foregoing amendments and remarks, Applicants respectfully request reconsideration of this application and the timely allowance of the pending claims.


Please grant any extensions of time required to enter this response and charge any additional required fees to our deposit account 06-0916.

Respectfully submitted,

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